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ACT WHICH

PRE-

CLUDES JURY TRIAL WITHOUT VIOLATING SEVENTH AMENDMENT-

Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No.
81-1300).
When the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) I was passed
in 1976, it was heralded as a major step in the limitation of the
sovereign immunity of foreign states.2 Since that time, the FSIA has
been the subject of extensive litigation.3 One question that has repeatedly arisen is whether federal jurisdiction over suits involving
foreign states is derived exclusively from the Act itself, 4 or is based on
other federal statutes. 5 Courts finding jurisdiction solely in the FSIA
must decide whether the statute allows a jury trial, and if not,
whether this contravenes the seventh amendment jury requirement.0
Examining these questions in the context of a personal injury action
brought by a United States citizen against a foreign governmentowned corporation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A.,7 concluded that the
FSIA is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for a suit against a foreign
state,' that it requires a non-jury trial," and that it complies with the
seventh amendment. 10

I Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1391, 1441 (1976)) [hereinafter
cited as FSIA].
' See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign hnmunity (pt. 1), 85 COM. L.J. 167, 167 (1980); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 33 (1978). See generally Kahale & Vega, Immunity
and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. RE:v. 1 (1976).
3 See Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 3 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1010 (1979).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 17 infra.
5 The two alternative jurisdictional sections are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1976). See notes 18
& 19 infra for the texts of these statutes.
6 E.g., Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui,'" 639 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981). cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300); see Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations:Sovereign Immunity (pt. 5), 85 CoM. L. J. 497, 499-501 (1980).
Note, Ruggiero v. Companie Pervana de Vapores and Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores: Jury
Preclusion in Actions Against Foreign Sovereign-Owned Instrumentalities, 20 CoLuI. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 199 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; Note, Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and the Seventh Amendment: Recognizing the Right to Jury Trials in Suits Against
Foreign States and State-Owned Corporations,21 VA. J. INT'L. L. 521 (1981).
660 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No.
81-1300).
8 Id. at 65.

9 Id.
10 Id. at 69.
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Calvin Rex, an American citizen," worked as a longshoreman for
the Northern Shipping Company.12 On August 14, 1978, he was
injured while unloading cargo from the M/V Chocano, a ship owned

by Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A. (CPV). 13 CPV was a Peruvian
whose shares were entirely owned by the Peruvian govcorporation
4
ernment.

Rex brought a personal injury action against CPV in district
court under a federal act according longshoremen the right to sue for

negligence,' 5 and demanded a jury trial. 16 He asserted jurisdiction
for this suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) 17 (actions against foreign

states), 28 U.S.C. § 133118 (federal question), and 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (2) '9 (diversity of citizenship). 20 CPV argued that since it was

"1 Brief for the United States of America at 4, Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660
F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
12 Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1980), reo'd, 660
F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300). The
Northern Shipping Company is a stevedore, or "one who works at or is responsible for loading
and unloading ships in port." WEasrE's NEv COLLEGATE DIcTIONAnY 1141 (4th ed. 1976).
" Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660
F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300). The
M/V Chocano is an ocean-going ship under Peruvian registry and is employed in foreign trade.
Id. at 461.

14

Id.

"5Id. at 460. The act in question is the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act § 5(b), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) [hereinafter cited as LHWCA].
10Rex v.Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660
F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). Section 1330(a) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title
or under any applicable international agreement.
Id.
's 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Section 1331 provides in part: "'The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions.., aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."
',28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). Section 1332(a) declares:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
Id.
20Rex v.Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1980), revod,
660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300).
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a foreign state as defined by the FSIA, jurisdiction rested exclusively
in section 1330(a).21 Because this section included the phrase "non23
jury civil action, ' 22 CPV moved to strike the jury trial request.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A. ,24 rejected CPV's contention
that section 1330(a) was the sole source of jurisdiction. 25 The court
predicated its jurisdiction instead on sections 1331 and 1332(a)(2),2 1

thereby avoiding an apparent conflict between the FSIA and the
seventh amendment. 27 The district court reasoned that the effect of
the Act was to remove the right to jury trial from section 1330(a), but
not to affect the right implied in sections 1331 and 1332.28 Accordingly, it granted Rex a jury trial under the latter provisions and denied
CPV's motion.2 9 Because of the difficult issue of constitutional law
presented in this case, 30 the court certified an interlocutory appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.3
The court of appeals, in a divided decision, 32 held that all actions
against foreign states under the FSIA are based exclusively on section
1330(a), 33 that these suits must be tried without a jury, and that this
requirement does not violate the seventh amendment.3 4 Accordingly,
the Rex court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case for additional proceedings. 35 Rex's petition for rehearing before
the court en banc was denied, 38 as was his petition for a writ of
37
certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.
21 Id. at 461. See note 17 supra for the text of section 1330(a). Section 1330(a) refers directly
to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976), which defines "foreign state," and to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(1976), which presents the standard for deciding whether an activity is not immune. See notes 40
& 41 infra for the texts of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1605(a)(2) (1976).
22 For the text of section 1330(a), see note 17 supra.
I Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rcv'd, 660
F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300).
24 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 50
U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1300).
25 Id. at 469. See note 17 supra for the text of section 1330(a).
.. 8 493 F. Supp. at 469. See notes 18 & 19 supra for the texts of sections 1331 and 1332(a).
-7 493 F. Supp. at 466.

21 Id. at 466-69.
29 Id. at 469.

30 Id. at 468-69. The district court observed that a timely determination of the question by
the court of appeals would prevent either an infringement of constitutional rights or a misapplication of legal resources by the selection of a jury. Id. at 469.
31 The appeal was certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). 493 F. Supp. at 469.
32 Judges Aldisert and Weis formed the majority in this decision and Judge Sloviter dissented.
660 F.2d at 61.
33 Id. at 65.
34 Id. at 64.
35 Id. at 69.
318Id. at 61.
11 Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No. 81-

1300).
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Judge Aldisert, writing for the majority, began his analysis by
searching for an interpretation of the FSIA which would prevent a
clash with the seventh amendment. 8 His quest focused on two preliminary inquiries: whether the federal district court had jurisdiction
under section 1330(a), and whether the statute prohibited a jury
trial.3 9 In answering the first question, the court found that CPV was
a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) 40 and was not immune
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), 4 t thereby conferring section 1330(a)
jurisdiction.4 2 The court of appeals, in addressing the second question, examined the language of the statute and its legislative history. 43 Judge Aldisert decided that by the words "nonjury civil
action," Congress intended to preclude the availability of a jury trial
in civil suits brought under the FSIA. 44 The Rex court gleaned additional support for this view from 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), 45 which autho-

' 660 F.2d at 63. Judge Aldisert indicated that he was following the rule of judicial
construction cited in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 448 (1830): "No court ought, unless the
terms of an act [of Congress] rendered it unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should
involve a violation, however unintentional, of the constitution." See also Pernell v. Southall
Realt', 416 U.S. 363, 365 (1974) (citing United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 369 (1971)).
3 660 F.2d at 63. See note 17 supra for the text of section 1330(a).
41 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). The relevant portion of § 1603 reads:
For purposes of this chapter(a) A "foreign state," except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as
defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.

ld.

41 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976). The relevant portion of § 1605(a) proclaims: "A foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case- . . . (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state .
4. 660 F.2d at 63-64.
'3 Id. at 64.
11 Id, see I J. MooRE, FEDERAL PnAcrIcE 1 0.66[4], at 700.179-.180 (2d ed. 1981). The
majority found additional support for this decision in the legislative history of the Act: "As in
suits against the U.S. Government, jury trials are excluded. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976). Actions
tried by a court without jury will tend to promote a uniformity in decision where foreign
governments are involved." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1976 U.S.
CODE CONC. & AD. Nmws 6604, 6611-12 [hereinafter cited as House REPORT].
" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976). Section 1441(d) states:
Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court
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rizes removal of actions under the FSIA from state to federal court but

asserts that "[u]pon removal the action shall be tried by the court
without jury. ' 46 Thus, the majority concluded that the jurisdictional
prerequisite had been met and that a jury trial was precluded under

4
section 1330(a) . 7

The court of appeals next addressed the district court's significant
holding that section 1330(a) was not the exclusive basis of jurisdiction
in suits against foreign states. 48 Judge Aldisert determined that the
legislative history would not support the district court's finding that
CPV was both a "foreign state" under the FSIA 49 and a "citizen of a
foreign state" under section 1332(a)(2), 50 and thus subject to jurisdiction under both statutes.5 ' He interpreted the district court to have
reasoned that Congress, by specifically amending section 1332 without amending section 1331, had authorized an alternative foundation
of jurisdiction in actions against foreign states which included a jury
trial right. 52 The majority found this explanation illogical, however,
because it would permit a jury trial in federal question actions
brought pursuant to section 1331, but not in diversity suits brought
53
against foreign states under section 1332.
In reaching its conclusion that section 1330(a) provided the sole
jurisdictional foundation under the FSIA, the Rex court also analyzed
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without
jury.
Id.

46 Id. The majority cited with approval, 660 F.2d at 63, the case of Williams v. Shipping
Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19,
1982) (No. 81-1300), which involved section 1441(d) and which held that actions removed from
state to federal court did not require a jury trial. Id. at 881. See also 1 J. MooRE, supra note 44,
0.66[4], at 700.180.
47
48

660 F.2d at 64.
Id.

See note 40 supra for the text of section 1603(b).
note 19 supra for the text of section 1332(a)(2). The district court noted, 493 F. Supp.
at 467 n.8, several other decisions which held that section 1332 could be a basis for jurisdiction in
this type of case, thus providing a right to jury trial: Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co.. 87
F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980), revod, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982); Lonon v. Companhia de
Navegacao Lloyd Basilerio, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, S.A.,
82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
51 660 F.2d at 64. The legislative history provided: "Since jurisdiction in actions against
foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similar jurisdictional basis
under section 1332 becomes superfluous." HOUSE REeoa-r, supra note 44, at 6613.
52 660 F.2d at 64. Since this suit was based on the LHWCA, a federal statute, the district
court decided that it had federal question jurisdiction under section 1331. 493 F. Supp. at 467. In
Trans Bay Eng'rs & Builders Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that although a jurisdictional statute which was commonly
used to avoid the sovereign immunity of the United States and to establish jurisdiction existed,
other statutes such as sections 1331 and 1332 could also be employed. Id. at 376.
53 660 F.2d at 64.
49

SO See
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two other circuit court opinions, Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores "'IncaCapac Yupanqui, ''5 4 and Williams v. Shipping Corp.
of India,55 in which the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Fourth Circuits affirmed district court denials of jury trial
requests on facts comparable to those in this case. 5 Judge Friendly,
in Ruggiero, scrutinized the applicable statutes and legislative history
and held that section 1330 was the exclusive source of jurisdiction for
suits against foreign sovereigns.5 7 He explicitly rejected the district
court's reasoning in Rex, 58 and determined that Congress designed
section 1330(a) as a "single vehicle" for juryless trials in suits against
foreign states 09 The Williams court in turn applied the Ruggiero
analysis to an action against a foreign state which was removed to
federal court under section 1441(d), 60 and came to the same decision.8 ' Consequently, Judge Aldisert found that the Ruggiero and
Williams opinions reinforced the premise that section 1330(a) was the
exclusive basis of jurisdiction against foreign states and that the Act's
82
language precluded a jury trial.
Because it decided that the unmistakable intent of Congress was
to withhold a jury trial in suits against foreign states, 6 3 the court was
forced to examine whether this denial resulted in a violation of Rex's
seventh amendment rights.6 4 The majority prefaced its discussion of
this issue by noting that congressional acts are presumed to be consti66
tutional, 5 especially when they pertain to foreign policy.
The Rex court then traced the evolution of judicial interpretation
of the seventh amendment.8 7 The amendment declares: "In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty

- 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
" 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982) (No.
81-1300).
56 660 F.2d at 62-63; see Williams, 653 F.2d at 876-77, 883; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 873, 881.
Like Calvin Rex, the plaintiffs in these two cases were longshoremen who brought suit seeking
damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while working aboard ships owned
by foreign government-controlled corporations. See 653 F.2d at 876; 639 F.2d at 873.
.1 639 F.2d at 874-79.
sl Id. at 876.
59 Id.

60 653 F.2d at 881. See note 45 supra for text of section 1441(d).
61 653 F.2d at 883. In Jones v. Shipping Corp. of India, 491 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1980),
the court applied the Williams analysis to a suit under section 1330(a) and came to a conclusion
identical to that of the Ruggiero court. Id. at 1263.
02 660 F.2d at 63.
61 Id. at 65.
4 Id.
Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2650 (1981)).
I1
Id.
67 Id.
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The
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... .8
this
phrase
in
ParUnited States Supreme Court initially interpreted
sons v. Bedford, 9 in which Justice Story stated that the seventh
amendment applied to "suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were adminis70
tered."
CPV contended that the purpose of the seventh amendment was
to protect the jury trial right existing when the amendment was
enacted in 1791, and that its scope could therefore not be enlarged to
include additional types of suits. 7' Under this approach, also adopted
by the Second and Fourth circuits in Ruggiero and Williams, 72 the
seventh amendment does not pertain to lawsuits against foreign states
engaged in commercial dealings, since such actions did not exist in
1791.73 Although the Rex majority agreed with the ultimate conclusion in Ruggiero and Williams that a right to jury trial is unavailable
in this particular type of case,74 it took exception to a characterization
of the common law "as frozen in 1791,"' ' " and rejected any attempt to
limit application of the seventh amendment only to those actions
70
specifically recognized by the common law at the time of its passage.
In searching for the proper seventh amendment test, the court
noted Rex's reliance on two United States Supreme Court cases, Curtis
v. Loether 77 and Pernell v. Southall Realty. 78 The Supreme Court
held in Curtis that "if [a] statute creates legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law," a
jury trial is necessary. 79 In the same year the Court decided in Pernell

68U.S.

CONST.

amend VII.

- 28 U.S. 433 (1830).
70

Id. at 447.

71 493 F. Supp. at 465.
72 Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 881; Williams, 653 F.2d at 881; see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,

193-94 (1974); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1078 (3d Cir. 1980).
See generally Kirst, Jury Trial and the FederalTorts Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh
Amendment Right, 58 TmX. L. REv. 549 (1980); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MiNN. L. REv. 639 (1973).
73 639 F.2d at 879; see Brandon, Sovereign Immunity of Covernment Owned Corporations
and Ships, 39 CORNMELL L.Q. 425 (1954).
71 660 F.2d at 63.
75 Id. at 66.
78 Id. (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1078 (3d Cir.

1980)).
7

415 U.S. 189 (1974).

8 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
78 415 U.S. at 194; see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 573, 584 (1978). Curtis involved the right

to jury trial in a Title VIII violation action. 415 U.S. at 189-90.
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that a jury trial was essential under the seventh amendment in suits

nonexistent under common law, as long as they "involve[d] rights and
remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather
than in an action in equity or admiralty." 8 0
Rex contended that the seventh amendment required a jury trial
in this case because damages are a legal, not equitable remedy. 8 ' The
majority dismissed this argument and asserted that a demand for
damages alone was not enough to turn this suit into one at common
law under the seventh amendment. 2 The court supported this con-

clusion by analogy to actions for damages against the United States
government, in which no right to a jury trial exists unless the statute
creating the cause of action clearly provides for one.8 3 Maintaining
that it was focusing on the nature of relief requested, the court of
appeals stated that the proper test was "whether [plaintiff's] action is
'8 4
in the nature of a legal remedy similar to a suit at common law."
The Rex court then explored prior case law regarding suits against
foreign sovereigns and the statutory history of the FSIA in order to
apply this formula.8 5
The court traced four major steps in the development of the area
of private suits against foreign states.8 6 First, in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,87 Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed the United

" 416 U.S. at 375. Pernell concerned the right to recover the possession of property in the
District of Columbia. Id. at 363.
It could be argued that the rights and remedies of the instant action are traditionally those
enforced in admiralty, not in law. But, as the district court in this case pointed out, even though
the LHWCA is based on the admiralty jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution, the
substantive foundation of a suit under section 905(b) is "a traditional tort action at law." 493 F.
Supp. at 465 & n.3; see Hurst v.Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 861 (1977). For more background on the effect of the FSIA on admiralty practice, see
generally Simmons, Admiralty Practice Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-A Trap
for the Unwary, 12 J. MAR. L. 109 (1980).
' 660 F.2d at 66-67.
'I
Id. at 67. The court noted that Rex's reliance on the Curtis-Pernelltest was misplaced,
particularly in view of the fact that the federal statutes in those cases did not deal explicitly with
the right to jury trial. Id. at 66.
"3Id. at 67. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2702 n.9 (1981); Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-89 (1943). The United States Supreme Court noted in Lehman: "Since
there is no generally applicable jury trial right that attaches when the United States consents to
suit, the accepted principles of sovereign immunity require that a jury trial right be clearly
provided in the legislation creating the cause of action." 101 S.Ct. at 2702 n.9. See generally von
Mehren, .supra note 2, at 45-46.
" 660 F.2d at 67.
15 Id. at 67-69.
IId. at 67-68.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). This suit was brought by the American owners of a ship
converted into an armed vessel by persons acting under the authority of the Emperor Napoleon.
Id. at 117.
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States' adherence to the absolute jurisdictional immunity doctrine for
foreign sovereigns. 88 Second, this immunity, which was premised on
the concepts of sovereign independent authority and international
comity, was extended in Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro8" to include commercial ships owned by foreign governments. 0 Third, an
exception to the absolute sovereign immunity doctrine was developed
in Mexico v. Hoffman,9 ' where the Court avoided embarrassing the
executive branch by denying a claim of immunity not recognized by
Finally, in the "Tate letter,"9 3 the State
the State Department. 2
Department adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
which immunizes "sovereign or public acts (jureimperii) of a [foreign]
state, but not . .. private acts (jure gestionis)."' The Rex court
concluded that because suits against foreign sovereigns never existed at
common law for reasons of governmental policy, "absolute judicial
fealty to executive decisionmaking" was required. 95
Turning to the legislative history, the majority noted that the
FSIA is the exclusive statutory basis for actions against foreign states 0
and is intended to serve a twofold purpose: to codify the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, and to require judicial determination
97
of questions concerning the sovereign immunity of foreign states.

Judge Aldisert decided that the design of Congress was to subject
foreign sovereigns to non-jury trials.9 8 Because there is no right to a
jury in civil law countries,9 9 the Rex court inferred that foreign states
might doubt its prudence and impartiality, and would consequently

"0Id. at 145-46. Chief Justice Marshall stated the doctrine as follows: '[N]ational ships of
war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered as
exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction." Id.
89271 U.S. 562 (1926). This case concerned a breach of contract action brought against a
merchant ship owned and operated by the Italian government. Id. at 569-70.
00 Id. at 575.
- 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
92 Id. at 35, 38. Mexico v. Hoffman involved an action in admiralty for negligence against a
ship owned and operated by a private Mexican corporation. Id. at 31-33. Because the State
Department policy at the time was to recognize only sovereign immunity of ships in "possession
and public service of the foreign government," id. at 32, the Mexican government's claim of
immunity from suit was denied by the Supreme Court. Id. at 38.
03 Letter from Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General, 26 DEe'r ST.
BULL. 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711
(1976) (appendix to opinion).
94 Id. at 984.
95 660 F.2d at 68.
00 Id.; HousE REPOar, supra note 44, at 6604.
07 660 F.2d at 68; HousE R.F.orrr, supra note 44, at 6604-06.
98 660 F.2d at 68-69.
09 Id.; see Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 878, 880 n.12.

NOTES

1982]

be more likely to cooperate in a trial without a jury. 0 0° The court
found additional support in the fact that Congress applied the special
procedures used in suits against the United States, which is not subject
02
to jury trial,' 0 ' to foreign sovereigns in the FSIA.
The Rex court maintained that limitation of the right to jury trial
was at the center of the congressional decision to allow jurisdiction
over foreign states in federal courts. 0 3 Inasmuch as Congress has the
power to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts, 0 4 Judge Aldisert
reasoned that prohibiting the legislative branch from limiting the
lesser right to jury trial could induce it to remove these cases from
federal jurisdiction entirely, thereby returning to absolute immunity
for acts of foreign states and leaving plaintiffs with no recourse what5
ever. 10
Because the FSIA failed to "[create] a cause of action in the
nature of a common law remedy" or to "codify a pre-existing cause of
action at common law," the majority decided that the congressional
prohibition of the right to jury trial in a suit under the Act did not
violate the seventh amendment. 0 6 Therefore, the court held that
since an action against a foreign sovereign in district court under the
FSIA is not a suit at common law within the seventh amendment,
07
there is no right to jury trial in this case.1
Judge Sloviter, in her dissent, agreed with the majority's analysis
of the non-constitutional issues.'10 She conceded that the FSIA is the
exclusive basis of jurisdiction in actions against foreign states as defined by the statute and that the constitutional issue must therefore be
confronted,' 0 9 but disagreed with the formulation and application of
the majority's seventh amendment test." 0 She contended that the
majority incorrectly concentrated on the type of defendant, rather
than the character of the plaintiff's suit."' In her view, this focus
100 660 F.2d at 69.

101 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976)). This denial of a jury trial was upheld in Lehman v.
Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2700-01 (1981).
1" 660 F.2d at 69. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d)-(e) (1976)); see HOUSE REPOrT, supra note 44,

at 6624-25.
I'll 660 F.2d at 69.
M'4Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868).
Is 660 F.2d at 69. While the court cryptically concluded that requiring a jury trial would
'ultimately work to the detriment of injured plaintiffs," the clear implication would be a return
to absolute immunity from suit for foreign states. Id.
106Id.
107 Id.

108 Id.

(Sloviter, J.,dissenting).

I at 69-70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Id.
11
Id. at 70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Id. Although the dissent agreed with the majority that one of the major congressional
purposes reflected in the FSIA was to place all sovereign immunity questions in the hands of the
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permits Congress to unconstitutionally deprive the plaintiff of a jury
a
trial by broadly defining "foreign state" in the FSIA to include
2
"
government.
foreign
a
by
corporation whose stock is owned
The dissent first examined the breadth of the seventh amendment
as reflected in the definition of "common law," and the analogy
between the sovereign immunity of the United States and that of a
foreign government." 3 Judge Sloviter concurred with the majority's
assertion that the amendment's scope was not limited to common law
forms of action that existed in 1791, n 4 but differed with its formulation of the proper test." 5 She maintained that the relevant standard
was that stated in Pernell: "whether the 'rights and remedies' at issue
[were] 'of the sort' enforced at common law." 11 Applying this formula, she concluded that the tort damages sought in this suit were a
customary common law remedy, and thus the right to jury trial
accrued to the plaintiff." 7 The Rex dissent criticized the majority for
switching without explanation from a test focusing on the type of

relief requested to one concerned with the common law ability to sue
a foreign state." 8
Judge Sloviter asserted that the majority's concentration on the
character of the defendant had induced it to liken the sovereign
immunity of the United States government with that of foreign
states."" Because of the different theoretical underpinnings of these
two types of immunity, she found this comparison mistaken. 20 The

judiciary, id. at 75 (Sloviter, J., dissenting), it parted company with the majority on the effect of

the congressional adoption of a restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Id. at 76
(Sloviter, J., dissenting). Where Judge Aldisert found an intent to protect foreign sovereigns from
increased liability by prohibiting a jury trial in actions against them, id. at 69, Judge Sloviter
discovered a plan to afford American citizens greater protection by permitting them to sue
foreign sovereigns for damages incurred within the context of commercial activities. Id. 76
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). For the definition of "foreign state," see text of section
1603, supra note 40. The dichotomy between a foreign state's public acts and corporate activities
was critical to the dissent, in contrast to the majority which did not even deal with it. See notes
127-34 inf'a and accompanying text.
1,3 660 F.2d at 70-72 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). She noted that there was a great deal of precedential
support for this view. Id.
ISId. See note 84 supra and accompanying text for a statement of the majority's test.
11 660 F.2d at 70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. at 375).
For the majority's discussion of the test, see notes 77-84 supra and accompanying text.
117 660 F.2d at 70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter's conclusion was based on the fact
that the plaintiff, a United States citizen, sued in tort for personal injuries resulting from his
work as a longshoreman unloading cargo from a ship owned by the defendant. Id.
I's Id.
120

I1 at 71 (Sloviter, J., dissenting); see note 83 supra and accompanying text.
Id.
660 F.2d at 71-72 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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dissent noted that, on the one hand, the United States' sovereign
immunity, under which the government cannot be sued without its
consent '2 '1 and can limit that consent by not allowing a jury trial,' 22 is
premised on a variety of theories.' 2 3 On the other hand, the sovereign
immunity of a foreign state is based on "comity and expediency in the
conduct of foreign affairs."' 24 Consequently, a foreign sovereign can
be sued without its consent under the normal laws of the host
state.' 25 Accordingly, Judge Sloviter decided that this analogy should
not be used to allow the denial of a right to jury trial in a suit against a
2
foreign state.'

The second section of the dissent explored the traditional differ27
entiation between a foreign government and its corporate interests, '
and the historical distinction between the United States government
and commercial corporations owned by it.

28

Judge Sloviter reasoned

that although corporations wholly owned by foreign sovereigns did
'
not exist in 1791, 129
when they later began to appear they were not
given presumptive immunity from suit.'

30

Corporate immunity,

when acknowledged, was not based solely on the status of a corporation as a wholly owned governmental entity or recognized agent,' 3 '
but rather on "the nature of the foreign sovereign's action or activity

121 Id. at 71 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976)). Judge Sloviter decided
that the congressional appropriations clause, U.S. CONS-. art. I, § 9, cl.7, "which conditions the
United States' liability on its own consent, puts the sovereign immunity of the United States on a
far different basis than either the sovereign immunity of the constituent states or of a foreign
state." 660 F.2d at 71 n.1 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
1'z. 660 F.2d at 71 (Sloviter, J., dissenting); see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572
(1962); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941).
12' 660 F.2d at 71 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter noted that United States' sovereign
immunity "has been attributed to a variety of constitutional, historical, and metaphysical
principles." Id.
I Id.; see First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional City de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
660 F.2d at 71 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing The Santissima Trinidad & The St. Andre,
20 U.S. 283, 352-53 (1822)).
' 660 F.2d at 72 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 72-73 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
'1" Id. at 73 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 72 (Sloviter, J., dissenting); see Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573 (1926).
" 660 F.2d at 72 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Only one pre-FSIA case held that a foreign
government-owned corporation was entitled to sovereign immunity in United States courts. See
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596
(1925).
31 660 F.2d at 72 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Cesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)). The dissent noted that another test used was
"[w]hether the corporate entity... is of such a character as to be recognized as a unit of the...
Government. " Id. at 72-73 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Investigation of World
Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 290 (D.D.C. 1952)).
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at issue." 132 Immunity was generally granted for official activities of
a foreign state and withheld for commercial activities.' 33 Thus, the
dissent asserted that at common law foreign corporations like CPV

could be sued, and that the majority's application of the sovereign

34
immunity of the foreign state itself was misplaced.
Judge Sloviter also contrasted actions involving the United States
government with those against commercial corporations owned by the
United States.' 35 The general rule is that sovereign immunity is not
given automatically to a corporation simply because the government
owns it. 13 Since lawsuits involving corporations controlled by the
United States government are brought in district court instead of the
court of claims,1 37 the plaintiff is usually awarded a jury trial even
38
though the owner of the defendant corporation is a sovereign state.'
Hence, the dissent concluded that any automatic identification of a
foreign sovereign with commercial corporations under its control was
39
unwarranted. '
The final section of Judge Sloviter's opinion focused on the majority's contentions that acts of Congress are presumed to be constitutional,' 40 and that the congressional foreign policy judgment echoed in
the FSIA must be afforded great weight.' 4 ' The dissent agreed with
the majority's view that the courts should defer to Congress when it
enacts foreign affairs legislation,' 42 but disagreed with its justification
of the denial of substantive constitutional rights through the congressional power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 143 There-

132 Id. at 74 (Sloviter, J.,dissenting); see Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d

354, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
133660 F.2d at 74 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 73 (Sloviter, J.,dissenting).
135 Id.

138Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 493 (1921); Bank of the United States
v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. 904, 906 (1824).
137660 F.2d at 74 n.6 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States
Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922)).
118Id. at 74 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing Legette v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., j78 F.
Supp. 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Washington v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134
(D.D.C. 1979)).
13,Id. at 73 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
140Id. at 75 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 75-76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
"1-ld. at 75 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). See note 66 supra and accompanying text. Judge Sloviter
implied that the majority would defer to congressional foreign affairs legislation only when
passed on the advice of the executive, while Judge Aldisert actually indicated that the judiciary
should treat both branches similarly. 660 F.2d at 75. However, both judges probably intended
the same standard to apply.
43 660 F.2d at 75; see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872); Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948); notes 104 & J05 supra and
accompanying text.
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fore, Judge Sloviter cautioned that whenever Congress exceeds the
scope of its powers, the judiciary must not be afraid to intervene to
44
prevent injustice. 1
The dissent discovered two major congressional purposes reflected in the FSIA: the judiciary should determine all sovereign immunity questions, and United States citizens should be able to bring
suits against foreign states conducting commercial activities. 45 Judge
Sloviter contended that the FSIA exceeded these objectives by broadly
defining "foreign state" to include foreign state-owned corporations
pursuing commercial activities. 4 Thus, in tort and contract actions
against a large number of these corporations, the plaintiff is deprived
of a jury trial. 47 Since these suits "involve 'rights and remedies of the
sort traditionally enforced in an action at law' " under the Pernell
test, 48 the dissent decided that the seventh amendment should apply
and a right to jury trial should be guaranteed. 4 In conclusion, Judge
Sloviter would have held that the non-jury trial provision in the FSIA
as applied to damage actions against foreign sovereign-owned corporations was unconstitutional because it contravened the seventh
amendment. 1-0
In the Rex case, both the majority and dissent agreed that section
1330(a) of the FSIA was the sole basis of jurisdiction for suits against
foreign states,' 5 1 but parted company on the formulation and application of the law of the seventh amendment.1 52 The exclusivity of
section 1330(a) is not as clear as the Rex opinions suggest, however,
when the text of the statute and legislative history are considered.
Following an examination of the minority and majority approaches to
this problem, 15 3 an unusual procedure for adjudication will be sug54
gested.
Recent federal court decisions construing the question of jurisdiction in actions brought under the FSIA by American citizens against

660 F.2d at 75 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 75-76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting); see House REPORT, supra note 44, at 6610; note 97
I"
supra and accompanying text.
16 660 F.2d at 76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
147 Id.
'1"

Id. (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. at 375).

4 Id. at 76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 69 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
I52
,' See notes 155-92 infra and accompanying text. This Note will refer to the prevailing
interpretation of this provision of the FSIA, represented largely by the decisions of the circuit
courts, as the "majority" view; while the term "minority" will be used to refer to the position
taken in several federal district court decisions, some of which have been reversed.
'5 See notes 193-211 infra and accompanying text.
'5"
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foreign government-owned corporations fall into two groups. The
majority view, of which Rex is a recent example, holds that section
1330(a) is the sole basis of a district court's jurisdiction under the
Act.155 The minority view, typified by Icenogle v. Olympic Airways,
S.A.,156 concludes that jurisdiction may be based on sections
1332(a)(2) (diversity of citizenship) or 1331 (federal question), in addition to section 1330(a) (actions against foreign states).157 Both viewpoints discuss the language of the statute itself and the legislative
history.
Analyzing the statute, the majority of courts claim that by using
the words "nonjury civil action" in section 1330(a), Congress repudiated the right to trial by jury in civil suits. 5 8 Moreover, since
section 1441(d) sanctions removal of actions under the FSIA from state
to federal court and expressly prohibits a jury trial,' 59 these courts
reason that sections 1441(d) and 1330(a) must be read together 60 and
8
thus, section 1330(a) must also preclude a jury trial.' '
The minority of courts contend that because the phrase "nonjury
civil action" is not used anywhere else in the FSIA,' 62 its scope is
limited to section 1330(a), and hence it does not affect the right to a
jury trial in a case brought under the other jurisdictional provisions. 63 Further, these courts note that the specific jury trial prohibition in section 1441 (d) does not extend to a suit originating in federal
court under section 1332(a)(2) because the text of the statute contains
no similar ban. 64
Both the majority and minority of courts also dispute the meaning of the legislative history. According to the congressional report,
the purpose of section 1330(a) was to "[provide] a comprehensive
jurisdictional scheme in cases involving foreign states."1 65 The major-

15- E.g., Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir. 1982); Ruggiero,
639 F.2d at 878; Williams, 653 F.2d at 881.
15682 F.R.D. 36, 37 (D.D.C. 1979); see 20 HARv. J. INT'L L. 720 (1979).
"' E.g., Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71, 75 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 667
F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982); Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 469; Lonon v. Campanhia de Navegacao Lloyd
Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
"5 See Rex, 660 F.2d at 64; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 875; Williams, 653 F.2d at 881. In fact, one
court has recently held that the presence or absence of a jury is entirely independent of the
congressional grant of jurisdictional authority to the district courts in section 1330(a). Houston v.
Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir. 1982).
119See note 45 supra for the text of section 1441(d).
160 See, e.g., Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 876 & n.7.
181 See, e.g., Rex, 660 F.2d at 64.
162E.g., Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1154 (4th Cir. 1982).
163 E.g., Icenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 39.
I"

Id.

165HoUSE RmPorr, supra note 44, at 6611.
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ity view holds that Congress, by the word "comprehensive," intended
that in suits against foreign states section 1330(a) be the "sole" basis of
jurisdiction. 6 6
Courts adopting the minority approach perceive several problems with this broad statement of purpose. 6 7 First, they assert that it
is illogical for a jurisdictional provision designed to be comprehensive
not to state on its face that it is the sole basis of jurisdiction in suits
against foreign states. 6 8 Second, these courts argue that in a "comprehensive jurisdictional scheme" such as section 1330(a), Congress
would not withdraw the right to a jury trial without evaluating the
possibility of constitutional violations.1 9 Third, they note that the
primary effect of limiting the district court's jurisdiction to section
1330(a) is to deny a jury trial in many cases usually tried by one simply
70
because one party is a foreign state.
The legislative history of section 1330(a) contains the assertion
that "[s]ince jurisdiction in actions against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similar jurisdictional basis
under section 1332 becomes superfluous."' 7' The majority of courts
interpret this statement to foreclose jurisdiction in a suit against a
foreign state under section 1332(a)(2).17 ' Additionally, they assert the
absence of a jurisdictional basis under section 1331 because it is inconsistent to permit jury trials in federal question actions against foreign
states under section 1331(a), but not to allow them on diversity of
73
citizenship grounds under section 1332(a)(2).1
The minority of courts base jurisdiction in suits against foreign
states under both sections 1332(a)(2) and 1331.174 Section 1332(a)(2)
was first relied upon in the case of Icenogle v. Olympic Airways,
S.A., '7 in which the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that even though there no longer was diversity jurisdiction over a foreign state itself after the passage of the FSIA, such
jurisdiction remained when one party was a "[citizen] or [subject] of a

' See, e.g., Ruggiero. 639 F.2d at 877; Williams, 653 F.2d at 878.
"

See. e.g., Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 468.
/d.
I6'

Id. at 468 & n.10.
Id. at 468, 469 n.14.
.. House REPorr, supra note 44, at 6613.
172 See, e.g., Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 877-78; Williams, 653 F.2d at 880.
See, e.g.. Rex, 660 F.2d at 64; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 876.
"

',

Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 469.
82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979). This case involved wrongful death actions brought by the
estates of three United States citizens killed in the crash of an airplane owned by a Greek
government controlled airline during a domestic flight between two cities in Greece. Id. at 3637.
','

"7
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foreign state." 76 The court stated that the broad definition of "foreign state" in section 1603(a), which includes a foreign government-

owned corporation,'17 is found in chapter 97 of title 28 and is expressly
limited to that chapter,178 while sections 1330(a)1 79 and 1332(a)(2) are
in chapter 85 of title 28. 180 Since there is a cross reference to section

1603(a) in section 1330(a)' 8' but not in section 1332(a)(2), the Icenogle

court concluded that the definition of "citizens or subjects of a foreign
state" was not modified by sections 1603 or 1330, and was not "superfluous" to section 1332(a)(2).1 82
In contrast to the majority position, the minority view maintains
that section 1331 is also a source of jurisdiction when the substantive
basis of a suit against a foreign state is a federal statute.8 3 Nonetheless, the majority view's criticism that the use of section 1331 irreconcilably authorizes a jury trial in federal question but not diversity
actions stands unrebutted.
Congress stated in the legislative history of section 1330(a): "As
in suits against the U.S. Government, jury trials are excluded ...
Actions tried by a court without jury will tend to promote a uniformity in decision where foreign governments are involved."' 8 4 The
176Id. at 37. See note 19 supra for the present text of section 1332(a). Before itwas amended
by the FSIA, the diversity jurisdiction statute stated:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof: and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof are additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) (amended 1976) (emphasis added).
The Icenogle court found that the section as amended preserved the original diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts in this type of case and that absent an unequivocal demonstration of contrary congressional intent, the traditional right to jury trial should be retained. 82
F.R.D. at 38.
'" See note 40 supra for the text of section 1603.
178 Section 1603 begins "[f]or purposes of this chapter." See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976).
M7See note 17 supra for the text of section 1330(a).
18082 F.R.D. at 38.

181Section 1330(a) refers to "foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title.- See 28
U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
182 82 F.R.D. at 38. Additionally, the court suggested that the references to "foreign state- in
the legislative history were designed to apply only to foreign sovereigns and not to the section
1603 definition of foreign state and that, in any event, the wording of the statute not the
legislative history, must prevail. Id. at 40.
183 The district court in Rex reasoned that since a suit under the LHWCA was a "civil (action)
.aris[ing] under the. . . laws.. . of the United States," section 1331 applied. 493 F. Supp. at
467-68.
384 HousE REpogr, supra note 44, at 6611-12. See note 44 supra and accompanying text for the
Rex majority's discussion of this quotation.
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majority of courts claim that this declaration demonstrates an intent
to deny jury trials in all cases where foreign states are concerned.' 8 5
The validity of this interpretation is questioned by the minority

of courts. The analogy between actions against the United States and
those against foreign states indicates to these courts that Congress
intended to equalize the treatment of foreign states and their corporations in our courts with that of the United States government and its

corporations, but not to completely deny jury trials in all cases.

86

Further, they reason that the necessity for "uniformity in decision" is
greater when the government of a foreign state is implicated than
when a commercial corporation owned by a foreign government is
87

involved. 1
As can be seen from the above analysis, both the minority and
majority approaches lead to unsatisfactory results. The minority view
distorts the meaning of the statute to find other sources of jurisdiction
in order to avoid a conflict with the seventh amendment. The majority view meets this conflict directly, but then restricts the scope of the
seventh amendment by narrowly defining the phrase "[s]uits at common law" to exclude actions against both foreign states and foreign
government-owned corporations.
The ramifications of the majority's seventh amendment interpretation are disturbing. For example, an American plaintiff suing a

,'

660 F.2d at 65; see Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 877-78: Williams, 653 F.2d at 879.
IIcenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 41. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 45. Although the United States
government is generally exempt from suit on the theory "that 'there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends,* " Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at
880 n.11 (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)), its commercial
corporations are subject to contract and tort actions triable by jury in district court. Icenogle, 82
F.R.D. at 41 nn.9 & 10. An analogous situation existed before the passage of the FSIA in 1976
with regard to foreign government-owned corporations. Id. at 38. Under the restrictive principle
of sovereign immunity, foreign governments were granted immunity from suit in United States
courts but their separate corporate entities were not. Id. at 38-39. The FSIA was designed to
codify this practice by retaining the right to jury trial in suits involving foreign governmentowned corporations who were "citizens or subjects of a foreign state," thus putting them on the
same footing with United States government-owned corporations. Id. at 41-42: see HoUsE
REPonr, supra note 44, at 6605. See notes 119-26 & 135-39 supra and accompanying text for the
Rex dissent's discussion of this issue.
,I7 1cenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 38-39. In passing the FSIA, Congress was primarily concerned that
a lack of "uniformity in decision" in cases involving foreign governments would result in "adverse
foreign relations consequences." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 44, at 6611. This concern must have
been focused on "foreign governments" rather than foreign government-owned corporations,
however, because before 1976 only one such entity had been granted sovereign immunity in
United States courts. Icenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 39 & n.3. (citing Oliver American Trading Co. v.
Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925)). Since uniformity of
decision had been maintained up to that point in actions tried by juries under section 1332(a)(2),
82 F.R.D. at 39, further "promotion" in this area was not required by the passage of the FSIA.
See notes 129-34 supra and accompanying text for the Rex dissent's discussion of this question.
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foreign government-owned corporation in federal court is denied a
jury trial under section 1330(a), 18 while the same corporation suing
the American as a defendant may have a jury trial under section
1332(a)(4).18 9 Additionally, the proclaimed procedural advantages of
the FSIA, such as in personam jurisdiction, 90 statutory rules for service of process,' 9' and execution of judgment, 9 2 do not appear to
outweigh the detriment suffered by the injured American plaintiff's
loss of the important right to a jury at the trial of the case on its merits.
Therefore, another solution which retains the intent of the statute and
legislative history but avoids these pitfalls is necessary.
A novel response to the jury trial problem was originally advanced in OutboardMarine v. Pezetel, 193 by the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware. The court recommended the
establishment of coordinate trials in which the judge determines the
facts with regard to the sovereign government and a jury decides the
facts pertaining to the non-sovereign defendants. 9 4 A similar solution was later proposed in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland in Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co.19 5
The district court in Houston construed the legislative history of
section 1330(a) to mean that Congress intended a two-part system of
adjudication. 9 6 The judge alone would determine whether the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity and the jury would then
decide the merits of the case, assuming diversity jurisdiction was
present. 97 Inasmuch as the Houston court relied on section
1332(a)(2), this plan follows the minority jurisdictional view. 9 8
Unsure whether the FSIA required a non-jury trial and cognizant
that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had docketed the
Williams case, an appeal on this question, the Houston district court
applied a modified version of its suggested plan, allowing the jury to
try the case, but also recording its own findings. 9 9 The court rea-
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For the text of section 1330(a), see note 17 supra.
For the text of section 1332(a)(4), see note 19 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976).

ld. § 1608.
Ig'
192Id. §§ 1609-1611.
193461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
191Id. at 396.
--s 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982). This action was brought

by a longshoreman who was seriously injured while unloading a ship owned by a Soviet
government-controlled corporation. Id. at 72.
19e Id. at 73.
197Id.
198See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
19, Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1152 (4th Cir. 1982).
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soned that its non-jury determinations could be substituted for the
jury's in the event that the court of appeals concluded in Williams that
2 00
the FSIA necessitated a juryless trial.

This in fact occurred. 201

The Houston court of appeals was thus faced with the problem of
what to do with the district court's set of contradictory jury and nonjury findings.

20 2

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co.,203 reversed the lower
court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial. 20 4 The opin-

ion was specifically limited to the question whether a trial without a
jury was an essential element in defining the district court's jurisdiction under section 1330(a) .205 The court of appeals held that the
existence of jurisdiction was independent of the presence or absence of
a jury in the courtroom. 20 Once jurisdiction was established, however, the court found that its previous20 8decision in Williams2 07 mandated that a non-jury trial take place.

The court of appeals decision in Houston supports the trial court's
bifurcated system by treating jurisdiction and the right to a trial by
jury as separate questions. This support is not vitiated by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's ultimate holding that a non-jury trial
is required following the determination of jurisdiction. The result is a
reflection of the precedential effect of its previous decision in Williams, which foreclosed the jury trial option.
A recommended alternative, which combines the Houston court's
jurisdictional analysis with the majority position's interpretation of
the exclusivity of section 1330(a), is to employ a bifurcated trial.
Under this procedure, the judge first determines whether the foreign
defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity. Jurisdiction attaches if
the judge finds that the defendant is a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) and is not immune under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 to
1607.209 Once the judge decides that jurisdiction is established, the
plaintiff is then entitled to a jury trial on the merits.
200 Id.

10 Williams, 653 F.2d at 833. See notes 54-62 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of

the Williams case.
10 Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir. 1982).
"1 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982).
20
205

Id. at 1153.
Id.

"0Id.
207 In addition to Williams, the court also cited Ruggiero and Columbia Note, supra note 6.
See 667 F.2d at 1153.
667 F.2d at 1153.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1976) (nature and extent of liability) (incorporated by
reference in section 1330).
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Even though this suggestion appears at first glance to contradict
the "nonjury civil action" language of section 1330(a), a closer look
reveals that it does not. A comparison of section 1330(a) with sections
1331 and 1332 discloses a general structural similarity. The major
difference is that section 1330(a) contains the phrase "nonjury" while
the other sections do not.2 10 One explanation for this deviation supported by the legislative history is that Congress was simply trying to
ensure that a judge would resolve the sensitive question of foreign
sovereign immunity.2 1 ' Hence, the word "nonjury" in section 1330(a)
mandates a trial by the judge only on the question of jurisdiction, but
not on the substantive issues of the case.
This dual system is a workable alternative to the minority and
majority solutions outlined above because it reflects an acceptable
reading of the statute and legislative history while preventing a conflict with the seventh amendment. Questions of prejudice against
2 12
foreign sovereign-owned corporations resulting from a jury trial
must be balanced with the detriment suffered by Americans who,
although they may have the procedural ability to serve process and
execute judgments,2 13 are precluded from a trial by jury on the substantive issues in suits against foreign states when they are plaintiffs
but not defendants.2 1 4 The application of this system will protect the
rights of foreign government-owned corporations through a judicial
determination of jurisdiction, and will guarantee United States citizens a jury trial on the merits of their case.
Linda R. Gardner

210 Compare the texts of section 1330(a), supra note 17, with section 1331, supra note 18, and

section 1332, supra note 19.
211 HOUSE REP'OR, supra note 44, at 6606.
212 The question of prejudice arose, for example, in Ruggiero. 639 F.2d at 880 n.12.
"' See notes 191-92 supra and accompanying text.
214 See notes 188-89 supra and accompanying text.

